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Abstract. A password-based authentication mechanism, first proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk, is
used to formally describe a password-based authenticator in the Canetti-Krawczyk proof model. A proof
of the security of the authenticator is provided. The possible practical applications of the authenticator
are demonstrated by applying it to two key exchange protocols from the ideal world of the Canetti-
Krawczyk model to produce two password-based key exchange protocols with provable security in the
real world of the model. These two new protocols are almost as efficient as those proposed by Halevi and
Krawczyk and have fewer message flows if it is assumed that the client must initiate the protocol. The
new authenticator contributes a new component which has been proven secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk
model, while the new key exchange protocols are provably secure making them attractive for use in
settings where clients must authenticate to a server using a relatively short password.
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1 Introduction
A major goal of modern cryptography is to enable two or more users on an insecure (adversary controlled)
network to communicate in a confidential manner and/or ensure that such communications are authentic. In
order to realize this goal, symmetric key cryptographic tools are often used due to their efficiency compared
to public key techniques. However, use of such tools requires the creation of a secret key (which is typically
at least 100 bits long) known only to the users communicating with each other. Because of the impracticality
of each possible pair of users sharing a long term secret key, public key and/or password-based techniques
are used to generate such a key when it is required. An advantage of this method of key generation is to keep
different sessions independent, which enables the avoidance of replay attacks (since the wrong key will have
been used for the replay) and lessens the impact of key compromise (since only one session will be exposed,
not all previous communications).
While public key cryptography can be used to provide a secure method of key agreement, it is not always
practical due to the inconvenience and expense of securely storing full length cryptographic keys in some
applications. Secure password based key agreement mechanisms (where the only secret information held by
one or more of the parties is a short password) are therefore necessary in such environments. One such
example is mobile environments, where memory may be scarce and the devices in use may not be tamper
resistant. However, because of the short length of the password, special care must be taken when designing
protocols to ensure that both the password and the key finally agreed upon are secret.
1.1 Motivation and Related Work
In the past, a trial and error approach to the security of cryptographic protocols has been taken where
cryptographic protocols were proposed together with informal security analysis. However, such protocols
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were sometimes wrong and usually only partially analysable. Indeed, in some cases, flaws have come to light
years after a protocol’s proposal and acceptance by the community as being secure.
These problems have led to the development of various formal methods of proving the security of a
protocol. Bellare and Rogaway [6, 7] first proposed a formal model for provable security of protocols. Although
their initial model only covered the case where two parties already share a long-term secret, it has been
extended, by themselves and others, to cover all the main types of authenticated key exchange (ake) protocol.
The proofs follow the style of most proofs in modern cryptography by reducing the security of the protocol
to the security of some underlying primitive. A limitation of these proofs is that they tend to be complex and
difficult for practitioners. Even more important from our viewpoint is that they are monolithic, fragile and
error prone [16, 23]. A small change in the protocol structure can destroy the proof and leave no indication
of how to repair it.
This paper works in the model adopted by Canetti and Krawczyk [9] which we refer to hereafter as the
ck-model. Two previous works of Bellare and Rogaway [6] and Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [4] form the
basis of the ck-model. The former uses the indistinguishability of [13] for defining security while the latter
postulates a two-step methodology for a substantial simplification in designing provably secure cryptographic
protocols. As a consequence, the ck-model inherits the aforementioned properties of [6, 4]. Its modularity is
gained by applying a protocol translation tool, called an authenticator, to protocols proven secure in a much
simplified adversarial setting where authentication of the communication links is not required. The result of
such an application is secure protocols in the unsimplified adversarial setting where the full capabilities of
the adversary are modelled. Moreover, various basic parts of a protocol can be proven secure independently
of each other and then combined to form a single secure protocol. This leads to simpler, less error-prone
proofs and the ability to construct a large number of secure protocols from a much smaller number of basic
secure components. An overview of the ck-model is given in Section 2.
Although other password-based protocols which have been proven secure do exist, such as those in [17]
and [19], they do not use a public key for the server and therefore are not amenable to the ck-model, since
it is impossible to separate the key exchange and authentication mechanisms of such protocols [15]. Thus
the above advantages of the modular approach used by the ck-model can not be realized by these protocols,
making the proof of security of a password-based authenticator and demonstration of its application in the
ck-model worthwhile.
1.2 Password-Based Protocols and Their Constraints
Because of the difficulty humans have remembering secrets even of a length of only 7 or 8 characters [11, 24],
passwords have a very small amount of entropy. For example, if all upper and lower case letters as well as
the digits 0 to 9 are used in an 8 character password, only 48 bits of entropy are possible. This means that
it is possible for an attacker to test all possible passwords in a relatively short amount of time and leads
to the requirement that off-line dictionary attacks must be infeasible (that is, an adversary with access to
transcripts of one or more sessions must not be able to eliminate a significant number of possible passwords).
In addition, on-line dictionary attacks must be infeasible (that is, an active adversary must not be able to
abuse the protocol in a way that allows him to eliminate a significant number of possible passwords). Note
that in an on-line attack, the adversary can guess a password and attempt to impersonate the user, so at
least one password can be eliminated per protocol run. We require that no more than one password can be
eliminated per protocol run with non-negligible probability. Other more general security properties required
are key authentication (parties participating in the key agreement know the identity of all other parties who
could possibly hold a copy of the key [20, p. 490]) and key freshness [20, p. 494] (key freshness is necessary
since it is assumed the adversary is able to find the value of old keys). It is also desirable that the protocol
be efficient in terms of the number of operations performed and the number of messages transmitted.
1.3 Our Focus
The main focus of this paper is on the security and application of a password based authentication mechanism
which was proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk [15] and used in their key agreement protocols. While these
key agreement protocols do not have an associated proof of security, the authentication mechanism itself
does. However, Boyarsky [8] has criticized both this proof and an earlier version [14] due to an inadequate
definition of security. In addition, while Halevi and Krawczyk state that their security formalization and
proof provide a basis for a password-based equivalent of an authenticator in the ck-model, the proof they
provide can not be used for this purpose for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the proof assumes that there is only
one uncorrupted party (in addition to the server) in existence. A valid proof for the ck-model must allow
any (polynomially bounded) number of uncorrupted parties. Secondly, the protocol does not actually enable
the transmission of an authenticated message, as required by a proper authenticator in the ck-model; the
only achievement is that the server knows the client responded to the server’s nonce.
In order to overcome these problems, we provide a formal description of a so-called message transmission
(mt-) authenticator based on the work of Halevi and Krawczyk as well as a proof of its security in the
ck-model. This mt-authenticator can be used for constructing authenticators which transform protocols in
the simplified adversarial setting to secure protocols in the full adversarial setting, as described in [4].
As a demonstration of the applications of our new mt-authenticator, we apply it to two protocols proposed
in the literature for the simplified adversarial setting and thereby obtain two secure key agreement protocols
using passwords. While it is possible to obtain other password-based key agreement protocols using this
method, the two presented in this paper are the most efficient that can be built from currently available
components proven secure in the ck-model. Finally, the new password-based key agreement protocols are
compared with those proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk [15] for performance and efficiency.
2 Overview of the Canetti-Krawczyk Approach
Here a brief description of the ck-model is given, but the reader is encouraged to see [4] and [9] for further
details. The ck-model defines protocol principals who may simultaneously run multiple local copies of a
message driven protocol. Each local copy is called a session and has its own local state. Two sessions
are matching if they have the same session identifier and the purpose of each session is to establish a key
between the particular two parties running the sessions. A powerful adversary attempts to break the protocol
by interacting with the principals. In addition to controlling all communications between principals, the
adversary is able to corrupt any principal, thereby learning all information in the memory of that principal
(eg. long-term keys, session states and session keys). The adversary may impersonate a corrupted principal,
although the corrupted principal itself is not activated again and produces no further output or messages.
The adversary may also reveal internal session states or agreed session keys. The adversary must be efficient
in the sense of being a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm.
Definition 1 (Informal). An ake protocol is called session key (sk-) secure if the following two conditions
are met. Firstly, if two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions, then they both accept the same key.
Secondly, suppose a session key is agreed between two uncorrupted parties and has not been revealed by the
adversary. Then the adversary cannot distinguish the key from a random string with probability greater than
1/2 plus a negligible function of the security parameter.
Two adversarial models are defined: the unauthenticated-links adversarial model (um) and the authenticated-
links adversarial model (am). The only difference between the two is the amount of control the adversary
has over the communications lines between principals. The um corresponds to the “real world” where the
adversary completely controls the network in use, and may modify or create messages from any party to
any other party. The am is a restricted version of the um where the adversary may choose whether or not
to deliver a message, but if a message is delivered, it must have been created by the specified sender and be
delivered to the specified recipient without alteration. In addition, any such message may only be delivered
once. In this way, authentication mechanisms can be separated from key agreement mechanisms by proving
the key agreement secure in the am, and then applying an authentication mechanism to the key agreement
messages so that the overall protocol is secure in the um. In actual fact, the definition of sk-security in the
um must be relaxed slightly when password-based authentication mechanisms are used, which is addressed
in Section 1.
Definition 2 (Informal). An authenticator is a protocol translator that takes an sk-secure protocol in the
am to an sk-secure protocol in the um.
Authenticators can be constructed using one or moremt-authenticators. An mt-authenticator is a protocol
which delivers one message in the um in an authenticated manner. To translate an sk-secure protocol in
the am to an sk-secure protocol in the um an mt-authenticator can be applied to each message and the
resultant sub-protocols combined to form one overall sk-secure protocol in the um. However, if the sk-secure
protocol in the am consists of more than one message, the resultant protocol must be optimized, which
involves reorder and reuse of message components.
In order to define the security of an mt-authenticator, it is necessary to formally define an mt protocol
in the am as follows. Upon activation within party A on external request (B,m), party A sends the message
(A,B,m) to party B and outputs ‘A sentm to B.’ Upon receipt of a message (A,B,m), B outputs ‘B received
m from A.’ An mt-authenticator is defined to be secure if it emulates mt in the um. Emulation is defined
to occur when the global output (which consists of the concatenation of the cumulative output of all parties
and the output of the adversary) in the am is computationally indistinguishable from the global output in
the um. (The output of the adversary is a function of its internal states at the end of the interaction.) Note
that in the um, it is necessary to augment a protocol with an initialization function to allow the required
bootstrapping of the cryptographic authentication functions. The ck-approach can now be summarized in
the following three steps.
CK1 Design a basic protocol and prove it sk-secure in the am.
CK2 Design an mt-authenticator and prove that it is secure.
CK3 Apply the mt-authenticator to the am protocol to produce an automatically secure um protocol. If
necessary, reorder and reuse message components to optimize the resulting protocol.
3 The MT-Authenticator
The authentication mechanism of Halevi and Krawczyk [15] is designed to authenticate a client to a server
and is based on a randomized encryption of a shared password. It has been modified here to form an
mt-authenticator for messages from a client to a server and its security level is discussed in Sect. 1. The
authenticator is denoted by λp-enc and Fig. 1 gives its specification. The following subsections give a detailed
description of various aspects of the authenticator.
A (Client) (Server) B
Password, pi Password of A,pi
Public key of B, eB Public key, eB
Unique message, m Secret key, dB
m−→ NB ∈R {0, 1}
η(k)
m,NB←−−−−
m, EeB (m,NB , A,pi)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. Password Based Authenticator, λp-enc
3.1 The Parties
Let there be a total of n parties, P1, . . . , Pn. We split the parties into two disjoint sets, the set of all servers
of size s and the set of all clients of size c where (c + s) = n. The values n, c and s are polynomial in the
security parameter k and may be written as n(k), c(k) and s(k) respectively.
3.2 Initialization
The initialization function Ip-enc consists of two parts, IPwd and IPubKey. IPwd invokes a password generation
algorithm once for each pair of (client, server) parties (Ci, Sj). This algorithm randomly chooses a password,
denoted piCiSj (or simply pi when the password is shared between A and B), from a password dictionary, D,
and assigns the password to Ci and Sj .
IPubKey invokes, once for each server party Sj , the key generation algorithm of an asymmetric randomized
encryption scheme which is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (also known as chosen
ciphertext postprocessing attack [5, 10]) with security parameter k. Let E and D denote the encryption and
decryption algorithms. (Note that E is a randomized encryption since otherwise the attacker could just try
the encryption for different values of piCiSj and see which one matched the ciphertext sent from Ci to Sj
in the third protocol flow in Fig. 1.) Let eSj and dSj denote the encryption and decryption keys associated
with server party Sj . The public keys, eSj , are distributed to all client parties Ci.
The public information is all public keys: I0 = {eS1, . . . , eSs}. The (completely) private information of
each server party Sj is the private key dSj . Shared private information for each Sj is the set of passwords
shared by Sj with each Ci, {piC1Sj , . . . ,piCcSj}. Shared private information for each client Ci is the set of
passwords shared by Ci with each server Sj, {piCiS1 , . . . ,piCiSs}.
3.3 Protocol Description
Since the majority of the following discussion is for only one client and server pair, we denote the client by A
and the server by B for simplicity. The protocol begins with the initialization function Ip-enc described above.
Each server then sets the number of unsuccessful attempts to complete the protocol with each client to 0.
If a client A is activated with an external request to send a unique message m to server B, then A outputs
‘A sent message m to B’ and sends ‘message: m’ to B. Upon receipt of ‘message: m’ from A, B chooses a
random value NB ∈ {0, 1}η(k) and sends ‘challenge: m,NB’ to A. Upon receipt of ‘challenge: m,NB’ from
B, A sends ‘encryption: m, EeB (m,NB, A,pi)’ to B. Upon receipt of ‘encryption: m, EeB (m,NB, A,pi)’ from A,
party B accepts m from A if, when decrypted, m is the same as the cleartext m, A is a valid client, pi is
the password shared between A and B, B has previously sent ‘challenge: m,NB’ (where m and NB match
those in the encryption and the challenge is still outstanding) and the number of unsuccessful attempts to
complete the protocol with A is less than or equal to γ. If B accepts m from A then B removes ‘challenge:
m,NB’ from the list of outstanding challenges and outputs ‘B received m from A’. If the value A in the
encryption is the identity of a valid client, but B does not accept the message m from A, then B increases
the number of unsuccessful attempts to complete the protocol with A by one.
4 Security of MT-Authenticator
Various notational conventions and definitions of security of an encryption scheme which are commonly used
in the literature are provided in Appendix A. It is assumed the reader is familiar with these notations and
definitions of security.
Proposition 1. Assume that Π is secure in the sense of ind-cca and that passwords are randomly chosen
from a dictionary D of size |D|. Then the output of protocol λp-enc is the same as that of protocol mt in
unauthenticated networks with probability (1 − %(k)) where:
%(k) ≤
(
ν(k) +
(
1−
(
1− γ + 1|D|
)s(k)c(k)))
(1)
and ν(k) is negligible.
Because the protocol λp-enc is password based, this is the best security level we can hope to achieve. In
practice λp-enc does not achieve ‘emulation’ in the sense of [4] due to the small size of the dictionary which
makes %(k) non-negligible. An adversary can always guess a password and attempt to use it in λp-enc. If the
attempt to complete the protocol is unsuccessful, the adversary can eliminate that password from the list of
possible passwords for the user it attempted to impersonate. However, we show that the probability of the
adversary doing better than this is negligible.
Because the probability that the output of λp-enc is different from that of mt is not negligible, λp-enc
can not be used to create sk-secure protocols using the original definition of sk-security. However, the
definition can be modified so that the probability of correctly distinguishing the key from a random string
is 1/2+ δ where δ is no longer negligible, but no more than a negligible function plus half of the probability
of randomly guessing at least one password. In our case, δ = %(k)/2 + ω(k) where %(k) is defined above
and ω(k) is negligible. (This can be shown by letting D be the event that the adversary guesses the session
key correctly and E be the event that the output of the key exchange protocol in the um is identical to
the output of the key exchange protocol in the am. Then Pr(D) = Pr(D|E)Pr(E) + Pr(D|¬E)Pr(¬E) ≤
(1/2+ω1(k))(1−%(k))+1 ·%(k) = 1/2+%(k)/2+ω(k) where ω(k) and ω1(k) are negligible.) We call protocols
that satisfy the new definition of security password-based session key (pbsk-) secure.
Proof. Let U be a um-adversary that interacts with λp-enc. We construct an am-adversary A such that
the output in the um and am is identical with probability 1− %(k). Adversary A runs U on the following
simulated interaction with a set of parties running λp-enc.
1. First A chooses and distributes keys for the imitated parties, according to function Ip-enc.
2. Next, when U activates some imitated client party A′ for sending a message m to imitated server party
B′, adversary A activates client party A in the authenticated network to send m to server B. In addition,
A continues the interaction between U and the imitated parties running λp-enc.
3. When some imitated party B′ outputs ‘B′ received mˆ from A′’, adversary A activates party B in
the authenticated-links model with incoming message mˆ from A.
4. When U corrupts a party, A corrupts the same party in the authenticated network and hands the
corresponding information (from the simulated run) to U .
5. Finally, A outputs whatever U outputs.
We first need to show that the above description of the behaviour of A is a legitimate behaviour of an
am-adversary. The above steps are easy to verify as legal moves for A, except for Step 3. In that case, let
B denote the event that imitated party B′ outputs ‘B′ received mˆ from A′’ where A′ is uncorrupted and
the message (mˆ, A,B) is not currently in the set U of undelivered messages. In other words, B is the event
where B′ outputs ‘B′ received mˆ from A′,’ and either A was not activated for sending mˆ to B or B has
already had the same output before. In this event we say that U broke party A′.
If B does not occur (that is, Step 3 can always (legally) be carried out), then the above construction is
as required. It remains to show that event B occurs only with low probability. Assume that event B occurs
with probability %(k).
There are a number of ways in which B could occur. Firstly, B could output the same nonce twice, coupled
with the same message. However, if the length of the nonce, η(k), is sufficiently large, the probability of this
occurring is negligible, which we denote with %1(k).
Obviously U can attempt to send a message as if from A by guessing the password and including the
guess in the final message of the protocol. If a maximum of γ unsuccessful login attempts are allowed for
each client, then U has a probability of at most γ+1|D| of succeeding for one particular client and server pair
without obtaining any information about the password (apart from the contents of D). Therefore U has
probability at most
(
1−
(
1− γ+1|D|
)s(k)c(k))
of succeeding for at least one client and server pair. Then we
show that the probability that B occurs is negligibly higher than this. That is, if B occurs with probability
%(k) and the function %′2(k)
def=
(
%(k)− %1(k)−
(
1−
(
1− γ+1|D|
)s(k)c(k)))
is not negligible, then we show
that the advantage Advind−ccaΠ,F (k) associated with the encryption scheme for a polynomial time adversary
F is not negligible, which contradicts the assumption that the encryption scheme is secure.
Let Π denote the encryption scheme in use. As noted in Appendix A.3, since the advantage of F attacking
the indistinguishability of the cryptosystem, Advind−ccaΠ,F (k), is negligible, so is the advantage of an adversary
F attacking the left-or-right indistinguishability of the cryptosystem,Advlor−ccaΠ,F (k). (An adversary attacking
left-or-right indistinguishability is provided with an oracle which always returns the encryption of either the
left or right of a pair of input plaintexts. The adversary must guess whether the oracle encrypts the left or
right plaintext. Indistinguishability is a special case of left-or-right indistinguishability where the adversary
may only make one such oracle query.)
From this point the proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3 in [1]. However, a few modifications are required
for this particular situation. Let F be an adversary having polynomial time complexity, and attacking lor-
cca of Π . Given an encryption key pk, a left-or-right encryption oracle Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) and a decryption
oracle Dsk(·), adversary F runs U on the following simulated interaction with a set of parties running λp-enc.
1. First F chooses and distributes keys for the imitated parties according to function Ip-enc with the
exception that the public encryption key associated with some server party B∗, chosen at random from
the set of servers S, is replaced with the input key pk. A∗ is chosen at random from the set of clients C.
Note that F knows the password shared between A∗ and B∗, pi.
2. If party A∗ or party B∗ is corrupted then the simulation is aborted and F fails.
3. If U activates any parties other than A∗ or B∗ to do anything, then F has the necessary keys and acts
according to protocol λp-enc.
4. If A∗ is activated by U to send the first message of the protocol for the message m to any server party
R, then A∗ outputs ‘A∗ sent message m to R’ and sends ‘message: m’ to R.
5. If party A∗ is activated by U to send the third message of the protocol λp-enc for the message m (where
A∗ has previously output ‘A∗ sent message m to R’) and nonce NR of the server R, where R is not B∗
then F finds the necessary encryption and sends ‘encryption: m, EeR(m,NR, A∗,piAR)’ where the public
key of R is eR and piAR is the password shared between A∗ and R.
6. If party A∗ is activated by U to send the third message of the protocol λp-enc for the message m and
nonce NB of the server B∗ (where A∗ has previously output ‘A∗ sent message m to B∗’), then F queries
the encryption oracle with Epk (LR ((m ‖ NB ‖ A∗ ‖ r) , (m ‖ NB ‖ A∗ ‖ pi) , b)) and receives output C,
where r is newly chosen for each oracle query and r R←−− D. F then sends ‘encryption: m,C’ to B∗.
7. If B∗ is activated by U to respond to ‘message: m¯’ with the second message of the protocol λp-enc, then
F randomly generates N¯B∗ and causes B∗ to respond with ‘challenge: (m¯, N¯B∗)’.
8. If U activates B∗ with ‘encryption: m,C’ where C is the output of the encryption oracle, and when
the encryption oracle was queried, the corresponding plaintexts were (m ‖ NB ‖ A∗ ‖ r) and (m ‖ NB ‖
A∗ ‖ pi) and B∗ had previously sent ‘challenge: (m,NB)’ (and the challenge is still outstanding) then B∗
outputs ‘B∗ received m from A∗’.
9. If U activates B∗ with ‘encryption:m,C’ where C is not an output of the encryption oracle, F queries its
decryption oracle and finds p ←− Dsk(C). If p is of the form (m ‖ NB ‖ P ‖ piPB) where P is the identity
of a party (possibly A∗) and piPB is the password shared between P and B∗, and B∗ had previously sent
‘challenge: (m,NB)’ (and the challenge is still outstanding) then B∗ outputs ‘B∗ received m from P ’
and removes the challenge from the list of outstanding challenges. If P is actually A∗ then if the attempt
was successful (that is, B∗ output the “received” message), then F guesses that the bit b associated with
the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle is 1. If the attempt was unsuccessful, F keeps a running total of the number
of unsuccessful attempts to complete the protocol for P and allows a maximum of γ attempts for each
client. (That is, after the γ+1th unsuccessful attempt to complete the protocol purportedly from P , B∗
will no longer accept any message from P .) If γ + 1 attempts have been made for A∗ or U finishes (and
there was no successful attempt for A∗ which had not used the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle) then F guesses
that the bit b associated with the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle is 0.
Note that B could be caused by B∗ outputting the same message twice. However, since all messages are
unique, A∗ sent the message only once. With probability (1− 2−η(k)) (where η(k) is the length of a nonce),
the challenge NB∗ in the encryption is different to the challenge A∗ encrypted. Thus F never asked for
a ciphertext from the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle to substitute as this encryption and F will detect that U has
successfully broken the encryption scheme.
Note that U ’s view of the interaction with F , conditional on the event that F does not abort the
simulation is identically distributed to U ’s view of a real interaction with an unauthenticated network if
the bit b associated with the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle is 1. (This is because A∗ and B∗ are randomly chosen.)
Therefore, the probability of guessing b correctly is the same as that of a successful forgery between A∗ and
B∗, which is 1−
((
1− γ+1|D|
)s(k)c(k)
− %′2(k)
) 1
s(k)c(k)
. On the other hand, if the bit b is 0, since no information
given to U depends in any way on the password, the likelihood of a successful forgery is no more than that
of being successful using random guesses, γ+1|D| . Therefore, the advantage of F , as defined in Appendix A, is:
Advlor−ccaΠ,F = Pr[Exp
lor−cca−1
Π,F (k) = 1]− Pr[Explor−cca−0Π,F (k) = 1]
≥ 1−
((
1− γ + 1|D|
)s(k)c(k)
− %′2(k)
) 1
s(k)c(k)
−
(
γ + 1
D
)
def= g(k)
= 1− y −
(
(1− y)p(k) − %′2(k)
) 1
p(k)
where y = γ+1|D| and p(k) = s(k)c(k). Now g(k) is less than or equal to the advantage of the adversary in
breaking the encryption scheme. If g(k) is not negligible, we have a non-negligible advantage in breaking the
encryption scheme, which contradicts our original assumption. Therefore, assume g(k) is negligible. Using
the definition of negligibility, this implies:
g(k) = 1− y −
(
(1− y)p(k) − %′2(k)
) 1
p(k) ≤ 1
kc
for c ≥ 1 and k ≥ kc
(1− y)p(k) −
(
(1 − y)− 1
kc
)p(k)
≥ %′2(k) (2)
It is shown in Appendix C that p(k)ap(k)−1b ≥ ap(k) − (a− b)p(k) when b ≤ ap(k) . Substituting this into (2)
gives p(k)(1−y)
p(k)−1
kc ≥ %′2(k) when k ≥
(
p(k)
1−y
) 1
c
= kd. Since (1−y) is less than one, (1−y)p(k)−1 is also less than
one, which implies p(k)kc ≥ %′2(k). Now assume that p(k) ≤ ke for k ≥ ke. Then 1kc−e ≥ %′2(k) for k ≥ max(kc, kd, ke).
Therefore %′2(k) is negligible, and this completes the proof. &unionsq
Appendix B provides details of variations to the authenticator and its proof to allow use of public
passwords and/or an encryption scheme indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack.
5 Some Applications of the Password-based MT-authenticator
We now show how the password-based authenticator λp-enc can be used in practice by applying it to some
key exchange protocols which have been proposed in the literature and proven secure in the am. We then
compare the resultant provably secure protocols in the um with the two password-based key exchanges
proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk [15] for performance and efficiency.
Let p and q be two primes such that q|(p− 1) and the length of q is k bits. Let G = 〈g〉 be a subgroup
of Z∗p of order q. The parameters (g, p, q) are assumed to be publicly known and all arithmetic is performed
in Z∗p unless otherwise indicated.
5.1 Existing Components in the CK-model
Several components in the ck-model exist which can be reused to derive new secure protocols in the um. We
present two sk-secure protocols in the am and one encryption-based mt-authenticator here which are used
later to derive two new provably secure um protocols. Whilst it is possible to easily obtain other provably
secure password-based key agreement protocols using other components, the two presented in this paper are
the most efficient and useful for practical situations that can be built from currently available components.
Provably Secure Protocols in the AM The choice of each of the am protocols below is based on
properties such as forward secrecy. Each of the protocols contains a session identifier (sid) whose value is not
specified here, but is assumed to be known by protocol participants before the protocol begins. In practice,
the session identifier may be determined during protocol execution [9, 22].
Protocol 2DH Protocol ENC
A B A B
x ∈R Zq y ∈R Zq r ∈R {0, 1}k
A, sid, gx−−−−−−→ c = EeB (r)
B, sid, gy←−−−−−− A, sid, c−−−−−→
K′ = (gy)x K = (gx)y r′ = DdB (c)
K = fr(A,B, sid) K′ = fr′(A,B, sid)
Fig. 2. Two sk-secure am protocols
A B
m←−
vA ∈R {0, 1}k
m, EeB (vA)−−−−−−−→
m,MvA(m,A)←−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 3. Encryption-based mt-authenticator, λenc
The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. The well-known Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol shown in Figure 2 and
named 2DH has been proven secure in the am under the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in [9].
This protocol features the desirable property of forward secrecy and has previously been extended to be
secure in the um using a signature-based authenticator [4].
The ENC Protocol. Protocol ENC shown in Figure 2 is proven secure in the am in [9] under the assumption
that the encryption scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attack and that {fr}r∈{0,1}k is a pseudorandom
function family as defined in [12]. It is assumed that A has the authentic public key of B, eB, and that B
has the corresponding private key, dB.
An Encryption-based MT-authenticator The encryption-based mt-authenticator [4] of Figure 3, λenc,
uses an ind-cca public key encryption scheme and a secure message authentication (MAC) scheme, denoted
M. It is similar to λp-enc and ENC in that party B needs to have possession of a public and private key pair
with the public key being known to party A. This mt-authenticator is used to construct an authenticator
for the am protocol consisting of two message flows.
5.2 Password-Based Key Exchanges of Halevi and Krawczyk
Since our mt-authenticator is based on the work of Halevi and Krawczyk [15], we compare their results
with ours. Their proposal has two key exchanges, one with and one without support for forward secrecy. As
previously mentioned, the proof of the authentication mechanism used in these protocols is not adequate for
use in the ck-model. Both protocols are claimed to be resistant to off-line dictionary guessing attacks and
use the following additional terminologies and notations.
The public password of the user is denoted by ppwd = MD(eB) where MD is a collision-resistant hash
function, e.g. SHA-1 [21]. A function F is needed such that with fixed input strings pi, x, the induced functions
F(pi; ·) and F(·;x) are one-to-one. For example, the concatenation function F(x; y) = (x ‖ y) satisfies the
requirement. The protocols also require the pseudorandom function family described in [12], {fr}r∈R{0,1}k .
Key Exchange with Mutual Authentication Figure 4 illustrates the first key exchange with mutual
authentication in [15] which does not provide forward secrecy. Hereafter, we refer to it as HK. Mutual
authentication of HK follows the general design of SKEME [18] where the server B uses the key r chosen by
the client A to authenticate itself. Explicitly doing this can be viewed as providing key confirmation.
A B
wB ∈R {0, 1}k
wB , eB←−−−−
ppwd
?
=MD(eB)
r ∈R {0, 1}k, y = fr(wB, B,A)
EeB (r,F(pi;wB , r, A,B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
y′ = fr′(wB, B,A)
y′←−
y
?
= y′
K = fr(y) K
′ = fr′(y′)
Fig. 4. The protocol HK
Mutual Authentication and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Figure 5 shows protocol HKDH, an
enhanced version of HK which achieves perfect forward secrecy by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Note
that since x is chosen randomly from Zq in every run, the random nonce wB in Figure 4 has been removed as
freshness can be ensured by just using x. Rather than using a Diffie-Hellman key, this enhanced protocol uses
K = fr(gxy) so that computing K requires both breaking the Diffie-Hellman primitive and the encryption
function.
A B
x ∈R Zq
gx, eB←−−−
ppwd
?
=MD(eB)
r ∈R {0, 1}k, y ∈R Zq
t = F(pi; gx, gy, r, A,B)
c = EeB (r, t), z = fr(c)
gy, c−−→
z′ = fr′(c)
z′←−
z
?
= z′
K = fr(g
xy) K′ = fr′(gxy)
Fig. 5. The protocol HKDH
5.3 Application of the Password-based MT-authenticator
This section applies λp-enc to the sk-secure protocols in the am described in Section 5.1 to obtain two secure
protocols in the um. It is intended that λp-enc be used in an unbalanced networking setting, where the client
A (typically the initiator) shares only a password with the server, while the server B (typically the responder)
possesses a public and private key pair. Moreover, we only show resultant protocols in the um that do not
require the client to possess a secret key (other than the password).
Application of λP−ENC to 2DH Since 2DH has two message flows, we need to construct a valid au-
thenticator for two-message protocols in the am. We cannot apply our password-based mt-authenticator to
both message flows of 2DH because it would violate the assumption that the client’s only secret key is the
password. Thus we combine λp-enc with λenc to form a valid authenticator. More precisely, λp-enc is applied
to the first flow of 2DH while λenc is applied to the second flow of 2DH. This application yields a new
pbsk-secure protocol in the um, 2DHPE, shown in Figure 6. The length of the nonce from λp-enc, η(k), has
been set to k for simplicity.
A B
x ∈R Zq, vA ∈ {0, 1}k y ∈R Zq
A, sid, gx, EeB (vA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB ∈ {0, 1}k
B, sid, gy, NB ,MvA(B, sid, gy, A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K′ = (gy)x
sid,EeB (A, sid, gx, NB ,pi)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
K = (gx)y
Fig. 6. The protocol 2DHPE
Application of λP−ENC to ENC Since ENC consists of only one message flow, λp-enc is the only
authenticator which needs to be applied and no optimization or reordering of messages is required. The new
um protocol is shown in Figure 7 and named ENCP. Note that client to server authentication is explicit
through use of pi, but server to client authentication is implicit through use of the server’s public key, eB.
A B
r ∈R {0, 1}k, c = EeB (r)
A, sid, c−−−−−→
NB ∈R {0, 1}k
sid,NB←−−−−−
sid, EeB (A, sid, c,NB ,pi)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′ = DdB (c)
K = fr(A,B, sid) K
′ = fr′(A,B, sid)
Fig. 7. The protocol ENCP
5.4 Protocol Performance Comparison
We now compare our results in Section 5.3 with the two password-based protocols of Halevi and Krawczyk [15].
Protocols 2DHPE and HKDH are compared with each other because they provide forward secrecy and pro-
tocols ENCP and HK are compared with each other because they do not provide forward secrecy.
Two aspects of protocol performance are examined, namely computational requirements and number of
message flows. The results are summarized in Table 1 which indicates how many operations a particular
protocol needs to perform for a successful protocol run. A number in brackets indicates that that number
of operations can be computed off-line. The numbers next to the protocol names indicate the number of
message flows in the particular protocol which is initiated by the client.
Protocol
Computational 2DHPE(3) HKDH(4) ENCP(3) HK(4)
Operation A B A B A B A B
Exponentiation 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 0 0 0 0
Asymmetric Encryption 1(1) 0 1 0 1(1) 0 1 0
Asymmetric Decryption 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1
Table 1. Protocol computational loads
Computational Requirements. The typical scenario in which password-based protocols are used involves a
client with somewhat limited computational resources. Therefore we want to shift as much computation as
possible to the server which will minimize the computational requirements of the client. In this regard, our
um protocol 2DHPE is as efficient as HKDH because both require two on-line computations on the client
side. Although the server in 2DHPE needs to perform two public key decryptions instead of the one in
HKDH, we stress that one of the reasons for using password-based protocols is to facilitate more efficient
clients.
Similarly, on-line computations for an ENCP client are the same as those for a HK client, although
an ENCP server must perform one more decryption than a HK server. It is important to note that there
is a double encryption in ENCP where c = EeB (r) is encrypted again in the last message using the same
public key of the server, eB. Although it seems intuitively that we can remove the double encryption by
replacing c with r in the third message of ENCP (and removing c from the first message), removing the
double encryption alters the protocol in such a way that the security proof is no longer valid. On the other
hand, since the encryption necessary to calculate c can be performed off-line in any case, removing it will
not save any on-line computational costs for the client (although it would save one on-line decryption at the
server).
Number of Message Flows. The number of message flows in a protocol may play a vital role in its performance.
Obviously an extra message exchange in a protocol will increase the time required to complete a successful
protocol run. Depending on the circumstances, a smaller number of messages may neutralize any disadvantage
due to the protocol being more computationally intensive on the server side. Initiation by the server is an
unusual protocol setting which does not allow clients to communicate with the server at will. Although this
can be overcome by adding a message flow at the beginning of the protocol so that the client can trigger the
start of the protocol, it also increases the number of messages in the protocol from three to four. In most
circumstances, more message exchanges increase protocol completion time due to factors such as propagation
delay and cause worsened performance.
Since both HKDH and HK are initiated by the server instead of the client, our protocols 2DHPE and
ENCP have the advantage of taking less time to complete the protocol if initiation must be performed by the
client. We argue that initiation by clients is a more natural setting as it allows the clients to communicate
with the server at will.
6 Conclusion
This paper has formally described a password-based authenticator, λp-enc, in the ck-model and formally
evaluated its security. It is impossible for any password-based authenticator to achieve the level of security
required for a proper mt-authenticator because the adversary can guess passwords and thereby attempt
to impersonate a client on-line with non-negligible probability of succeeding due to the small size of the
password dictionary. However, it was proved that λp-enc achieves the best possible level of security for a
password-based authenticator.
The password-based authenticator was then applied to two protocols that have been proven sk-secure in
the am elsewhere in the literature, resulting in two provably secure key exchange protocols in the um. Other
password-based key exchange protocols can easily be obtained by using λp-enc with other components which
have been proven secure in the ck-model elsewhere in the literature, but such protocols constructed using
presently available components are less efficient than the two presented here. The two new protocols were
compared with the two proposed by Halevi and Krawczyk which use the same authentication mechanism,
with the result that the new protocols are almost as efficient in terms of number of computations, but
better in terms of number of message flows. In addition, the new protocols have associated formal proofs of
security, while the Halevi-Krawczyk ones do not. These properties make the new protocols attractive for use
in settings where clients must authenticate to a server using a relatively short password.
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A Definitions and Notational Conventions
This section contains various definitions and notational conventions used in this paper. We begin with some
notational conventions. The notation a ←− B indicates that if B is an algorithm then a is assigned its output.
If the algorithm is randomized then it flips any coins necessary to generate the output. If B is a set, then a
is chosen at random from that set. The notation a R←−− B or a ∈R B is used in the same way, but emphasizes
the random nature of the algorithm B or the random choice from the set B. The notation |x| can be used
in two ways. If x is a message, it means the length of the message. If x is a set, it means the cardinality of
that set.
We now give the definition of a negligible function provided in [3] and use the same notation and definition
of an encryption scheme as given in [5]:
Definition 3 (Negligible). A function % : N→ R is negligible if for every integer c > 0 there is an integer
kc such that %(k) ≤ k−c for all k ≥ kc.
Definition 4 (Encryption Scheme). An encryption scheme Π consists of three algorithms (K,E ,D) where
K is the key generation which takes a security parameter k ∈ N and returns a randomly selected pair (pk, sk)
of matching public and secret keys. The (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E takes a public key pk and
message m and produces a ciphertext c. This is denoted c R←−− Epk(m). The decryption algorithm D takes a
secret key sk and ciphertext c and returns either the corresponding plaintext message m or the special symbol
⊥ indicating that the ciphertext c was invalid.
Of course, for any key pair (pk, sk) generated by K, if c ←− Epk(m) then it is required that m ←− Dsk(c) for
any message m. Encryption, decryption and key generation must also be able to be completed in polynomial
time.
An encryption oracle under the key pk is denoted Epk(·). A decryption oracle under the key sk is denoted
Dsk(·). If an adversary A has access to an oracle, it is indicated as a superscript. For example, if A has access
to the decryption oracle Dsk(·), this is denoted ADsk(·).
A.1 Indistinguishability of an Encryption Scheme
Firstly we present the definition of indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (ind-cca)
given by Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval and Rogaway [5], with some slight modification to the notation. This
definition (or an equivalent one) is generally used in the literature when referring to indistinguishability of
a public key cryptosystem. We start by defining an experiment and the advantage of the adversary in the
experiment.
Definition 5 (Expind−ccaΠ,A ).
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme, let A= (Afind, Aguess) be an adversary, let b ∈ {0, 1} and
let k ∈ N. Then we define an experiment Expind−cca−bΠ,A (k) as the following sequence of steps:
(pk, sk) R←−− K(k)
(x0, x1, s) ←− AEpk(·),Dsk(·)find (k)
y ←− Epk(xb)
d ←− AEpk(·),Dsk(·)guess (k, y, s)
Return d
We require that Aguess does not query Dsk(·) on y and that the two messages (x0, x1) have equal length.
Note that the provision of the encryption oracle Epk(·) is trivial for public key cryptosystems since any message
can be encrypted using the public key. However, it is included in the definition for clarity.
Definition 6 (Advind−ccaΠ,A ).
We define the advantage of the adversary A (where A was described in Definition 5) as:
Advind−ccaΠ,A = 2 · Pr[Expind−cca−bΠ,A (k) = b]− 1 (where Pr[b = 0] = 12)
= Pr[Expind−cca−1Π,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind−cca−0Π,A (k) = 1]
According to [5],Π is secure in the sense of ind-cca ifA being polynomial-time implies thatAdvind−ccaΠ,A (·)
is negligible.
We note that this is precisely the same as the definition of ftg-cca (find-then-guess security under
chosen ciphertext attack) given by Bellare, Desai, Jokipii and Rogaway for symmetric key encryption in [2].
However, they go a step further to define the advantage of the scheme:
Definition 7 (Advind−ccaΠ ).
For any integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd, we define the advantage of the encryption scheme Π as:
Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxAcca
{
Advind−ccaΠ,A (k)
}
where the maximum is over all A with time complexity t, each making at most qe queries to the Epk(·) oracle,
totalling at most (µe − |x0|) bits (where |x| denotes the number of bits in x), and also making at most qd
queries to the Dsk(·) oracle, totalling at most µd bits.
Note that for a secure encryption scheme, if the running time t of the adversary is polynomially bounded,
then so too are qe, µe, qd and µd. This being the case, Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible since
Advind−ccaΠ,A (k) is negligible.
A.2 Left-or-Right Indistinguishability
In order to complete the proof of security of the authenticator, a different definition of indistinguishability
is used. This definition can be found in [2], where it is called left-or-right indistinguishability. It is based on
a left-or-right oracle Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) where b ∈ {0, 1}. The oracle takes input (x0, x1) and returns Epk(xb).
Note that an adversary with access to such an oracle can always find Epk(x) for any x since this can be found
by Epk(LR(x, x, b)). The goal of the adversary is to guess the bit b. The difference between this definition
and the one above is that the oracle Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) may be queried many times, instead of only once.
Indistinguishability under a left-or-right chosen ciphertext attack (lor-cca) is defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Explor−ccaΠ,A ). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme, let A be an adversary, let b ∈ {0, 1}
and let k ∈ N. Then we define an experiment Explor−cca−bΠ,A (k) as the following sequence of steps:
(pk, sk) R←−− K(k)
d ←− AEpk(LR(·,·,b)),Dsk(·)(k)
Return d
We require that A never queries Dsk(·) on a ciphertext C output by the Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) oracle, and that
the two messages queried of Epk(LR(·, ·, b)) always have equal length.
Definition 9 (Advlor−ccaΠ,A ).
We define the advantage of the adversary A (where A was described in Definition 8) as:
Advlor−ccaΠ,A = Pr[Exp
lor−cca−1
Π,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Explor−cca−0Π,A (k) = 1]
Definition 10 (Advlor−ccaΠ ). For any integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd, we define the advantage of the encryption
scheme Π as:
Advlor−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxAcca
{
Advlor−ccaΠ,A (k)
}
where the maximum is over all A with time complexity t, each making at most qe queries to the Epk(LR(·, ·, b))
oracle, totalling at most µe2 bits, and also making at most qd queries to the Dsk(·) oracle, totalling at most
µd bits.
The scheme Π is said to be lor-cca secure if the function Advlor−ccaΠ,A (·) is negligible for any adversary
A whose time complexity is polynomial in k.
A.3 Equivalence of Indistinguishability Definitions
The different definitions of security in the sense of indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack pre-
sented above are basically equivalent for an adversary whose time is polynomially bounded. Namely, the
following implications hold:
Advind−ccaΠ,A (k) is negligible⇔ Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible (3)
Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible⇐ Advlor−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible (4)
Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible⇒ Advlor−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible (5)
Advlor−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) is negligible⇔ Advlor−ccaΠ,A (k) is negligible (6)
Advind−ccaΠ,A (k) is negligible⇔ Advlor−ccaΠ,A (k) is negligible. (7)
Equations (3) and (6) hold because if the time complexity, t, of A is polynomially bounded, then so
are qe, µe, qd and µd. Equation (4) holds because an ind-cca experiment is a special case of a lor-cca
experiment. Equation (5) holds due to a result proven by Bellare et al. in [2]:
Advlor−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ qe ·Advind−ccaΠ (k, t, qe, µe, qd, µd).
Since a polynomial multiplied by a negligible function is also a negligible function, this result implies (5).
The result used in the proof of security of the authenticator is given in (7) and follows from (3) to (6).
B Variations of λP-ENC
B.1 Encryption Indistinguishable under Chosen Plaintext Attack
Note that the decryption oracle in the proof of security in Sect. 4 is required to be able to tell whether other
clients have successfully authenticated themselves. If each client had a different (personal) public key for
B, then the decryption oracle would not be necessary, and the proof could be completed if the encryption
scheme was non-malleable to chosen plaintext attack. The proof would be a combination of parts of the
above proof with the proof of Theorem 5.3 in [1]. Boyarsky [8] has noted (without providing the proof) that
this condition is sufficient for security against a static adversary. However, if the model and definition of
security in [4] are used as above, the scheme can be proven secure against a dynamic adversary.
B.2 Using a Public Password
Halevi and Krawczyk [15] address the problem of a client having insufficient storage for a server’s public
key by using public passwords. A public password is the hash of the server’s public key and must be kept by
the client. The public password may be seen by other parties, but not be able to be modified by them. The
authenticator must be modified so that the server sends its public key to the client in the second message
flow and the client checks that the hash of the public key it received is the same as the public password.
As stated by Halevi and Krawczyk [15, p. 247], if the generator of the public keys can be trusted not to
look for collisions, the hash function need only have second preimage resistance. Otherwise, it must have
(strong) collision resistance. The proof in Sect. 4 remains substantially the same if public passwords are used.
However, the definition of %(k) must be changed to be:
%(k) ≤
(
%1(k) + %2(k) + %3(k) +
(
1−
(
1− γ + 1|D|
)s(k)c(k)))
where %3(k) is the probability that the client is sent a public key which is not the server’s public key but
whose hash is the same as the public password. Since the hash function has either second preimage resistance
or (strong) collision resistance, %3(k) is negligible. Subsequent expressions involving %1(k) in the proof should
replace %1(k) with (%1(k) + %3(k))
C Proof of an Inequality
We wish to prove:
pap−1b ≥ ap − (a− b)p , for b ≤ a
p
. (8)
Now we know
ap − (a− b)p = pap−1 +
p∑
i=2
(
p
i
)
(−1)i−1 ap−ibi
and using this equality, (8) can be rewritten as:
0 ≥
p∑
i=2
(
p
i
)
(−1)i−1 ap−ibi . (9)
We know that (9) will hold when:
(
p
2i
)
ap−2ib2i ≥
(
p
2i+ 1
)
ap−2i−1b2i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
p− 1
2
⌋
.
Rearranging, we obtain:
1 ≥
(
p
2i+ 1
)
a(
p
2i
)
b
∴ 1 ≥ (p− 2i) b
(2i+ 1) a
, for all i such that1 ≤ i ≤
⌊
p− 1
2
⌋
.
Since p ≥ (p−2i)(2i+1) , (8) is satisfied when:
b ≤ a
p
.
